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The Kharkiv oblast: a fragile stability
Tomasz Piechal
Kharkiv oblast, which is located in the immediate vicinity of the Donbas region, and which shares 
a 315-km stretch of Ukraine’s border with Russia, was one of the regions where attempts were 
made to kindle separatist sentiments during the spring of last year. Some central government 
buildings were briefly occupied by pro-Russian demonstrators who declared a ‘Kharkov Pe-
ople’s Republic’, but efficient countermeasures by the Ukrainian institutions of force quickly 
calmed the situation in the region. However, the oblast still remains a target for acts of sabo-
tage, which are probably directed by Russian secret services. Nevertheless, the situation in the 
region is now stable, both in terms of public sentiment and local politics. The main competitors 
in the arena of local politics are Hennadiy Kernes, the mayor of Kharkiv, and Arsen Avakov, the 
current head of the Ukrainian Interior Ministry. Despite many years of hostility, neither of the 
politicians appears to have initiated a power struggle as yet – Kernes retains his influence on 
the city council, and Avakov controls the local security services.
The outbreak of the Donbas conflict was of key importance for the situation in the oblast, as it 
motivated the local elites – who feared a repeat of the separatist scenario in their region – to 
counteract the threat. The war’s impact on the situation in the region is clearly apparent. Khar-
kiv oblast has become the destination for many of the refugees escaping from the Donetsk and 
Luhansk oblasts. According to official data, they currently number around 170,000 people, but 
even the local authorities emphasise that the true figure actually exceeds 300,000.
At the same time, the Ukrainian-Russian conflict has adversely affected the economy of the re-
gion, whose business has so far largely been conducted with the Russian Federation. As a result, 
during 2014 there was a significant drop in the value of exports (by 8.3%) and imports (19.3%); 
the oblast’s industrial output has also fallen (by 5.2%). However, these figures are much better 
than those from other regions of Ukraine. The reasons for this include an increase in govern-
ment orders from local defence industry plants. This has also led to many jobs being retained, 
which has helped to calm the public mood. The peace in the Kharkiv oblast remains fragile, 
however, and the threat to the region’s stability is high.
A divided society
Kharkiv oblast is the fourth largest region of 
Ukraine; it has a population of 2.73 million peo-
ple, more than half of whom (1.4 million) live in 
Kharkiv city. An important component of the 
local patriotism is the fact that Kharkiv was the 
capital of Ukraine for 14 years1. To this day, the 
local people still cherish the uniqueness of their 
city and region in the country. In a study con-
ducted in March by the International Republican 
Institute, up to 90% of the residents of Kharkiv 
1 In 1920-1934 Kharkiv served as the capital city of the 
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.
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declared their pride in their city, the highest such 
figure in the whole country. The capital of the 
district is also an important industrial, cultural 
and academic centre; the city has around 150 re-
search institutes and more than 20 universities, 
and the number of students exceeds 200,000.
While the adjacent Donbas oblast was settled 
in the nineteenth century by workers from 
throughout the Russian Empire, the beginnings 
of the Kharkiv region’s development date back 
to the seventeenth century and the period of 
colonisation by the Cossacks2. Since then, the 
language and culture of Ukraine have clear-
ly predominated in the region. Kharkiv only 
became dominated by the Russian language 
through the process of industrialisation in the 
nineteenth century and the Soviet period, and 
the ensuing influx of workers from Russia; ac-
cording to data from the last Ukrainian census 
of 2001, 65.9% of Kharkiv city’s residents de-
clared Russian to be their language of every-
day communication. However, in the rest of the 
oblast, Ukrainian retains a clear advantage to 
this day; in most areas it is the mother tongue 
of 70-90% of the population3.
Due to the proximity of Russia and the num-
ber of its socio-economic links with the region, 
the Kharkiv oblast has for years been suscepti-
ble to Russian influence. Its information space 
is dominated by the Russian media, as a result 
of which the Kharkiv oblast has been exposed 
to the strong influence of Kremlin propagan-
da. This situation persists to this day; accord-
ing to research conducted in late February by 
the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, 
at the national level Russian media has had its 
greatest impact on the residents of the Kharkiv 
2 The Kharkiv oblast, together with the Sumy oblast, lie 
within the historical areas known as Sloboda Ukraina or 
the Slobozhanschyna; during the mid-eighteenth century 
this was a Cossack autonomous region, first as part of the 
Russian tsar’s dominions, and then the Russian Empire. In 
1765, on the orders of Catherine II, the autonomous region 
was abolished and the land taken over by the Russian ad-
ministration as the Sloboda Ukraine Governorate.
3 Data from the Ukrainian national census of 2001, http://
ukrcensus.gov.ua/
oblast, and has a considerable influence on 
shaping the political views of the local pop-
ulation4. As a result, the region remains sec-
ond only to the Donbas as the most pro-Rus-
sian oblast in Ukraine, although it is clear that 
as a result of Russian aggression, the number 
of people supporting closer ties with Rus-
sia is falling, and the number of people who 
favour adopting a neutral position is rising.
As recently as July 2014, Kharkiv oblast ex-
pressed the strongest support (after the Don-
bas) for Ukraine’s accession to the Customs 
Union (42%) and had the lowest percentages 
of supporters of European integration (31%) 
and entry into NATO (11%)5. Based on the lat-
est surveys conducted by IRI in March this 
year, the number of people favourable to the 
European Union has remained at a similar lev-
el (30%), but there has been a definite fall in 
supporters of the Customs Union (to 22%). At 
the same time, the largest increase has been 
recorded in the number of undecided respon-
dents who do not favour either the EU or the 
CU; 17% of respondents supported ‘another 
path of integration for Ukraine’, and 32% could 
not make an unequivocal decision. However, 
previous polls (conducted last December by 
the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology) 
show that Kharkiv oblast still contains the larg-
est group of people (in Ukraine) who do not 
rule out the possibility of the region joining 
the Russian Federation, and who thus support 
a possible separatist movement in the region; 
4 See Appendix 3.
5 According to a survey conducted between 28 June and 
10 July 2014 by the Rating research group. See http://
ratinggroup.com.ua/products/politic/data/entry/14098/
Russian media has its greatest impact on 
the residents of the Kharkiv oblast, and 
has a considerable influence on shaping 
the political views of the local population.
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those who have a positive or ambivalent atti-
tude to integration with Russia account for 
over 20% of the region’s inhabitants6, although 
the number of people who declare a strongly 
pro-Russian attitude has fallen significantly.
The March survey by the International Republi-
can Institute shows that the region is dominat-
ed by pessimism; as many as 72% of the region’s 
respondents declared that in their opinion the 
situation in the country is systematically wors-
ening. They primarily blame politicians associ-
ated with the current government for this; low 
marks are given to the work of the president 
(62% of respondents), the government (70%) 
and parliament (70%). Only 26% of the respon-
dents in the region trust the President (60% of 
respondents declare no confidence in him), and 
16% the Prime Minister (with 69% giving neg-
ative responses). However, this drop in support 
for the government in Kyiv does not mean a rise 
in pro-Russian sentiment. The conflict in Don-
bas is an important factor influencing the views 
and moods in the region; anti-war sentiment 
in the region is rising steadily, and the oblast’s 
residents are aware that a possible outbreak of 
separatist sentiment could lead to a repeat of 
the events in the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts.
Around a third of the population display clearly 
pro-Ukrainian sentiments, and their presence 
is by far the most visible in the region. This is 
because, with the acceptance of the central 
government, pro-Ukrainian movements have 
begun large-scale social activities, which has 
led to their current dominance of the public 
6 See Appendix 2.
space. Thanks to the  assent of the central gov-
ernment and the passivity of law enforcement 
agencies, Kharkiv has seen the removal of many 
Communist monuments, including the largest, 
a statue of Lenin which had stood in the cen-
tral square of Kharkiv city. This change of mood 
has also led to the city being decorated with 
Ukrainian symbolism; for example, one of the 
multi-storey apartment blocks has been paint-
ed with the largest mural of Taras Shevchenko 
in Ukraine. Previously, the largest such mural in 
the city had been a portrait of Yuri Gagarin.
The influx of refugees from the Donbas has also 
been of great importance for the public mood 
in the region; the majority of the people who 
have fled the occupied territories have come 
to the Kharkiv oblast. According to official es-
timates, there are around 170,000 refugees in 
the region at the moment7, but even the au-
thorities acknowledge that the actual number 
is higher, over 300,0008; the offices have only 
registered those individuals who have asked for 
help, and many refugees have avoided official 
registration. Given that the Kharkiv oblast has 
around 2.7 million inhabitants, it means that 
the number of people residing in the region 
has increased by over 10% since the start of the 
conflict in the east. The rapid influx of refugees 
has contributed to a significant rise in the costs 
of housing (both rental and purchase), and has 
also affected the local labour market. It should 
be noted that a large number of the displaced 
persons do not conceal their distaste for the au-
thorities in Kyiv.
The key players in the region
The most powerful players on Kharkiv’s political 
scene remain Arsen Avakov, the current head of 
the Ukrainian Interior Ministry, who comes from 
7 According to estimates by the State Service for Emergency 
Situations: http://www.mns.gov.ua/news/34232.html
8 http://www.sprotyv.info/ru/news/15855-gubernator-har-
kovskoy-oblasti-igor-raynin-situaciyu-na-harkovsh-
chine-ne-stoit
Anti-war sentiment in the region is ris-
ing steadily, and the oblast’s residents are 
aware that a possible outbreak of separatist 
sentiment could lead to a repeat of the Don-
bass’ events.
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Kharkiv; and the current mayor Hennadiy Kernes, 
who has links to the former Party of Regions, and 
who enjoys great popularity in the city9. Since 
the local elections in 2010, the open conflict be-
tween the two politicians has been ongoing. At 
that time – in a very dubious manner – Kernes 
won the mayoralty, winning by just 0.63% (2726 
votes) from Avakov, his main competitor10. After 
politicians associated with the Party of Regions 
took power in the city and the oblast, they struck 
hard at companies owned by Avakov, who had 
built up a substantial business empire over sev-
eral years of activity in the region11. In January 
2012 an investigation was initiated against the 
oblast’s former governor (between 2005 and 
2010 Avakov was head of the Regional State 
Administration, appointed by Viktor Yushchen-
ko), as a result of which he was forced to flee 
abroad12. He returned to the country in Decem-
ber that year, when he won a seat in parliament, 
and thus gained immunity from prosecution. 
The success of the revolution opened up an op-
portunity for Avakov to rebuild his influence in 
the city; in addition, his importance in the region 
rose thanks to his decisive intervention to pre-
vent the development of separatist movements 
in the city in March and April 2014.
While Avakov has for some years adopted 
a strongly pro-Ukrainian position, Hennadiy 
Kernes’s policy is to keep open his options for 
making deals with anyone. He has made him-
self into a politician who is first and foremost 
9 Kernes is viewed positively by 48% of the capital’s res-
idents, 34% are dissatisfied. Data from the March re-
search by the International Republican Institute.
10 According to the exit polls Avakov won, with 34.7% 
of the votes, with Kernes receiving 30.9% in the 
polls. http://ru.tsn.ua/ukrayina/oficialno-kernes-pobe-
dil-na-vyborah-mera-harkova.html
11 Avakov controlled or remains in control, via his own appoin-
tees, shares in many branches of the local economy, includ-
ing food, construction, gas, energy, media and banking.
12 The case against him was brought by the Kharkiv prose-
cutor’s office after receiving reports of possible criminal 
activity by the Regional State Administration, which at that 
time was run by Mykhailo Dobkin. The cause of the prose-
cution was apparently the illegal alteration in the status of 
a 55-hectare allotment from agricultural to industrial use, 
which could have earned Avakov a 6-year prison sentence. 
After this affair came to light, Avakov escaped to Italy.
a good steward of the city, a local patriot who 
respects the traditions and history of Kharkiv 
– hence, among others, his opposition to the 
demonstrators who wanted to pull down the 
Lenin statue in October last year, and his op-
position to the possibility that Kharkiv City 
Council would officially name Russia as an ag-
gressor state13. Although he has declared that 
he sees the future of Kharkov in Ukraine alone, 
he is clearly counting on a deterioration of the 
economic situation in the country. His polit-
ical supporters are politicians associated with 
the Party of Regions, whose hopes for a suc-
cessful political and business future are asso-
ciated with an increase in dissatisfaction with 
the rule of the new Ukrainian government 
in the south-eastern regions of the country.
Both Kernes and his longtime business & po-
litical partner Mykhailo Dobkin (a current par-
liamentary deputy for the Opposition Bloc, 
who was that party’s candidate in the last 
presidential election) have retained their influ-
ence on both the City and Regional Councils, 
and many of their people are also still carry-
ing out their functions in the regions of the 
oblast. Moreover, the last parliamentary elec-
tions showed that the popularity of former Par-
ty of Regions politicians in the oblast remains 
high; the Opposition Bloc scored a decisive 
victory in the region; and in the single-man-
13 Kernes has on two occasions emphasised in the media (in 
June 2014 and February 2015) that he does not see Russia 
as the aggressor, as it “has given loans and delivered gas to 
Ukraine”. He has also stated that it is necessary to precisely 
research and verify any reports of the presence of Russian 
forces in the Donbas.
Kernes’ political supporters are politi-
cians associated with the Party of Re-
gions, whose hopes for a successful po-
litical and business future are connected 
with an increase in dissatisfaction with 
the rule of the new Ukrainian government.
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date constituencies14, candidates with pasts in 
the Party of Regions won 13 of the 14 seats15.
A chance to weaken the position of the Kernes/
Dobkin team may arise in the forthcoming lo-
cal elections (planned for this autumn), but the 
pro-Ukrainian parties’ failure to consolidate 
may pose a problem (their failure to agree on 
common candidates largely contributed to the 
success of the ‘Regionals’ in the parliamentary 
elections). At the same time, even Kyiv’s rep-
resentatives acknowledge that Kernes still has 
considerable public support, and even if the 
local elections go to a second round, he re-
mains favourite in the race for mayor. The pro-
Ukrainian parties still lack a clear leader, and 
there is no strong, obvious rival to run against 
Kernes. Although there are rumours that Ava-
kov himself could stand in the race, it seems 
that such a scenario is unlikely as long as he 
remains on the Council. However, Avakov’s final 
decision may depend on changes in the com-
position of the government (by resignation, 
for example) which could occur as a result of 
falling support for the main coalition party, the 
Popular Front, and rising tension within the co-
alition. At the same time, there is no-one else 
close to the head of the Interior Ministry who 
could successfully fight for the mayoralty16.
Although Kernes has stated that he will partici-
pate in the upcoming local elections, he has still 
not decided which party he will run for; he may 
14 Parliamentary elections in Ukraine are held on a mixed basis; 
half of the deputies are chosen by proportional representa-
tion, and the other half in single-mandate constituencies,
15 See Appendix 1.
16 Possible candidates from within Avakov’s camp include 
his advisers Anton Herashchenko (currently a parliamen-
tary deputy) and Ivan Verchenko (a leader of Kharkiv’s 
Euromaidan).
attempt to create his own local political move-
ment. Meanwhile the General Prosecutor’s Of-
fice has initiated an investigation into the cur-
rent mayor of Kharkiv, as a result of which an 
indictment has been forwarded to the court17; 
this could be a step by the authorities towards 
blocking his candidacy. However, such a firm 
action by the law enforcement agencies may 
result in a violent reaction from the mayor, who 
in the defence of his interests could mobilise 
his electorate and the administrative apparatus 
under his control, which could contribute to 
a destabilisation of the situation in the city.
Beside the Avakov/Dobkin and  Kernes camps, 
there are no other strong political groups In the 
Kharkiv oblast; the Communists, who hitherto 
had been highly rated in the region, have seen 
a significant weakening of their support. The re-
gional governor Ihor Raynin has been trying to 
create his own regional policy since his appoint-
ment; he is associated with Borys Lozhkin, the 
current head of the presidential administration18.
Russian attempts at sabotage
Another factor influencing the situation in the 
region is the terrorist attacks which have been 
carried out by subversive groups controlled by 
Russia. According to the Ukrainian security ser-
vices around 10 sabotage groups are operating 
within the oblast, under the control of Russian 
special services19; apart from these, there are also 
17 On 26 March this year, the Prosecutor General’s Office 
submitted to the court an indictment against Kernes 
and two of his bodyguards. All three are suspected of 
kidnapping, torturing and beating activists from the 
Kharkiv Euromaidan. In April, a court in Poltava started 
proceedings against the accused, but the hearing only 
began at the third attempt; Kernes claimed health is-
sues, and there were also provocations which prevented 
the trial from starting. In the case of Kernes, a conviction 
would carry a sentence of 5 to 10 years in prison.
18 From November 2014 until his appointment to the gov-
ernorship, Raynin was first deputy head of the Presiden-
tial Administration under Lozhkin. Previously, Raynin 
had worked for many years in Kharkiv’s Regional State 
Administration.
19 http://www.unian.net/society/1012408-v-harkove-deyst-
vuet-10-razvedyivatelno-diversionnyih-grupp-hnr.html
The pro-Ukrainian parties in Kharkiv still lack 
a clear leader, and there is no strong, obvious 
rival to run against Kernes.
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several ‘sleeper’ groups. Most of the saboteurs 
are Ukrainians (often with criminal records), but 
these groups also include citizens of the Russian 
Federation. Individual groups receive training in 
different Russian cities, primarily in Rostov-on-
Don, Tambov and Belgorod (located only 70 km 
from Kharkiv), which also hosts the coordinat-
ing centre of the entire network. Depending on 
the type of attack, saboteurs are allegedly paid 
amounts ranging from US$300 to US$10,000. 
This information is based largely on testimonies 
from persons suspected of planning sabotage 
who have been detained by the Ukrainian secu-
rity services; since last spring dozens of people 
involved in destabilising the situation in the re-
gion have been arrested20.
According to government estimates, since the 
beginning of the year sabotage groups have car-
ried out 12 terrorist acts in Kharkiv oblast; since 
the spring of last year, there have been a total 
of 48 such incidents21. The worst such act took 
place on 22 February this year, when during 
a march commemorating the tragic events on 
the Maidan in Kyiv, an explosive device hidden 
in snow by the roadside went off. Four people, 
including a 15-year-old boy, were killed as a re-
sult of the explosion, and nine were wounded.
The saboteurs’ most common means of attack 
is planting concealed explosives. Their main tar-
gets are railway and military facilities, as well 
as the local offices of pro-Ukrainian organisa-
tions dealing with soldiers who have been on 
the front line, among others. Apart from isolat-
ed incidents, no-one has been injured, and the 
material losses inflicted by the saboteurs have 
also been minimal, which calls the effectiveness 
of their actions into question. Because these 
acts of sabotage in Kharkiv oblast have been 
relatively harmless, they should be seen pri-
marily in a political light. They are a signal from 
20 http://www.business.ua/articles/media_view_ukr/Ponad-pro-
rosiyskih-diversiynih-grup-zatrimano-na-Harkivschini-ostan-
nim-chasom-%E2%80%93-ochilnik-ODA-94739/ 
21 http://news.liga.net/news/politics/5236149-za_god_v_
kharkove_i_oblasti_proizoshlo_43_terakta_mvd.htm
Russia that forces still exist within the region 
which are able to oppose the Ukrainian author-
ities; and they are also aimed at creating the 
impression that a ‘Kharkov People’s Republic’ 
scenario is still possible. In addition, as similar 
terrorist acts are taking place in other towns in 
south-eastern Ukraine (mainly Odessa), Russia’s 
subversive activity should be seen as another 
tool to destabilise the situation in the country.
It is difficult to assess the impact of these actions 
on the public mood in the oblast. Due to the in-
creased activity of the authorities and the Securi-
ty Service of Ukraine, the majority of the threats 
have been counteracted; the effectiveness of the 
Security Service’s actions is  important for pub-
lic confidence in the central government. At the 
same time, the media atmosphere around this 
activity means that some of these incidents have 
been exaggerated by both the government and 
the Ukrainian media, which may distort the real 
image of the situation. However, there is no doubt 
that the terrorists’ main aim is to maintain the lev-
el of unrest in the region, so that in the future it 
could lead to a possible revival of anti-Kyiv senti-
ments. Any failure by the security services in the 
field of counter-terrorism could in fact undermine 
the central government’s power and contribute to 
the growth of discontent with Kyiv in the region.
The region’s economy  
in the face of the crisis
Kharkiv oblast, which is one of the most im-
portant regions for the Ukrainian economy 
(in 2013, it generated 5.6% of total Ukrainian 
GDP), has been severely affected by the nation-
wide economic crisis. As a result of the unsta-
There is no doubt that the terrorists’ main 
aim is to maintain the level of unrest in the 
region, so that in the future it could lead to 
a possible revival of anti-Kyiv sentiments.
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ble situation in the country, and because of the 
proximity of the area affected by the war, there 
has been a sharp decline in imports and exports 
from Kharkiv oblast, which has led to a system-
atic deterioration in the situation. While in 2014 
the value of exports amounted to US$1.82 bil-
lion (down 8.3%) and imports to US$1.88 billion 
(down 19.3%), in the first quarter of this year, 
these values  fell to US$273 million (down 41% 
compared to the same period in the previous 
year) and US$283 million (down 39.8%) respec-
tively. Meanwhile last year, Ukraine’s overall ex-
ports fell by 13.5%, and its imports by 28.3%.
Despite these problems, the oblast remains an 
important industrial centre for Ukraine; there 
are over 600 factories on its territory, of which 
around 70 are state-owned. Local production is 
based primarily on machine factories (including 
agricultural products and elements for nucle-
ar power plants), chemicals and metalworking. 
A strong role in the regional economy is also 
played by factories related to the energy sector, 
armaments and food. Thus, production in the 
region is highly diversified, and primarily based 
on mechanical production, which distinguishes 
it from the economy of the neighbouring Don-
bas, focused on heavy industry (metallurgy) 
and mining (mainly coal). Another difference 
is that the Kharkiv region does not contain so 
many developed oligarchic groups, who took 
control of entire branches of the economy in 
the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts.
In 2014, the industrial production value in 
Kharkiv oblast fell by 5.2% (the overall decline 
in production in Ukraine ran at the level of 
10.1%), and amounted to US$4.6 billion (in Jan-
uary-March this year the figure stood at about 
US$940 million, a decrease of 14.1% compared 
to the same period in the previous year), which 
accounted for 6.1% of national production in 
Ukraine last year.
The region’s economic situation has to a certain 
extent been rescued by an increase in orders 
by the state from the defence industry compa-
nies based in the oblast (Ukroboronprom has 
12 plants in the oblast), allowing it to maintain 
a high level of employment in some of the plants. 
However, even in this area some companies have 
been having problems; salaries in the Kharkiv 
State Aviation Production Plant have not been 
paid since last August due to financial problems.
Small and medium businesses, which have 
largely developed in the oblast due to its prox-
imity to the Russian border, have suffered par-
ticularly because of the conflict with Russia. 
Difficulties in border traffic, including tighter 
border controls, have caused significant prob-
lems in doing business. The international sit-
uation has also affected the industrial plants 
located in the region; the vast majority of their 
production was oriented towards exports to 
Russia, which in recent years accounted for 
around 47% of the region’s exports. It is true 
that the regional authorities have ensured that 
many of the plants managed to change the 
markets for their sales, but it must be borne 
in mind that most Ukrainian industry produces 
goods that are either not competitive in terms 
of quality and price, or for which demand exists 
only on specific markets. As a result, many fac-
tories have had to reduce production.
Conclusions
As a result of the consensus of local elites and 
the decisive action taken by Kyiv to discipline lo-
cal power structures, separatist sentiments in the 
region have been successfully dampened down. 
However, the sabotage groups in the region, which 
the Security Service of Ukraine is actively trying to 
counteract, remains an unresolved problem.
The Kharkiv oblast remains an important 
industrial centre for Ukraine; there are 
over 600 factories on its territory.
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The failure of the ‘Kharkov People’s Republic’ 
project stems not only from the government’s 
positive and active fight against the separat-
ist groups, but also from the fundamental 
differences between the Kharkiv and Donbas 
oblasts. The former – in contrast to the neigh-
bouring Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts – has 
much stronger Ukrainian roots. Although in 
Kharkiv city most residents speak Russian, the 
rest of the oblast speaks Ukrainian on a daily 
basis. The machine-based industry in the re-
gion means that educated engineers are indis-
pensable in the production process; as a result 
many universities have been established there, 
and Kharkiv itself is an important Ukrainian ac-
ademic centre. On a national scale – also due 
to the large number of art schools – Kharkiv is 
a centre of Ukrainian culture. As a result, the 
region has a sufficiently large number of active, 
pro-Ukrainian-minded people, who have been 
able to resist separatist tendencies.
In recent months, Kharkiv oblast has seen the 
marginalisation of people and organisations of 
a pro-Russian political orientation. This does not 
mean, however, that such people do not exist. 
The oblast remains the most susceptible region 
of Ukraine (apart from the Donbas) to Russian 
propaganda, and because of its economic ties 
with the Russian Federation, it suffers the con-
sequences of the Ukrainian-Russian conflict. The 
deteriorating economic situation of the country 
and the region, together with the rising prices 
and the increases in rates for municipal services, 
could contribute to a rise in discontent among 
some of the oblast’s population, which both 
politicians opposed to the current government 
in Kyiv (mainly the current members of the Op-
position Bloc and former members of the Party 
of Regions) as well as Russia will want to ex-
ploit. The issue of the 300,000 refugees from 
the Donbas, and their future in the region, is 
another growing problem.
The most important factor which could destabi-
lise the situation in the region, however, may be 
the upcoming local elections; if the government 
in Kyiv decides to prevent Hennadiy Kernes from 
running for mayor of Kharkiv (by bringing a con-
viction in the criminal trial against him), this may 
cause a violent reaction from his supporters, and 
contribute to the destabilisation of the situation 
in the entire region. In addition, it remains pos-
sible that the forthcoming elections will witness 
a political struggle for power between Kernes 
and Arsen Avakov, the current head of the Inte-
rior Ministry. For now, however, Kharkiv oblast 
maintains its fragile peace, and all the parties are 
waiting for the next developments in the eco-
nomic situation and on the Donbas front.
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2. Do you agree that your region should secede from Ukraine and join the Russian Federation? 
Source: responses to opinion polls conducted by the Kiev International Institute of Sociology 
on 6-17 December 2014
3. Index of the influence of Russian media on the views of the inhabitants of Ukrainian regions  
Source: opinion polls conducted by the Kiev International Institute of Sociology on 14-24 February 2015
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